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Abstract
In light of the current explosion of application of machine learning in data
analysis and inference, we examine a particular challenge raised by the new
EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The challenge we address
pertains particularly to the demand that analyses of a person’s data must be
comprehensible to that person.
While there is a long tradition in viewing the world in terms of objects
and properties in intuitive ways, recent decades have entertained a tension
between more rule-based theories of mind (e.g., the representational theory
of mind) and more holistic approaches (e.g., connectionism). While both
approaches have merit, one seems to depart too much from a classical
understanding of “knowing” to adequately satisfy the imminent legal realisty,
and the other seems to be incapable of adequately capturing modern data
analysis (as of yet).
As a solution to this predicament we propose a pragmatic compromise
based on argumentation theory which seems to be able to provide a
solid foundation in classical concepts, while at the same time permitting
enthymematic presuppositions. We argue that developing a framework for
explaining machine behavior in terms of abstract argumentation theory can
address this dilemma.
1 Introduction
In light of the current explosion of application of machine learning in data analysis
and inference, we examine a particular challenge raised by the new EU General Data
Protection Regulartion (GDPR). Specifically, the GDPR (Sections 13-15) gives users
targeted by automated decision-making a right to obtain “meaningful information about
the logic involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged consequences of such
processing for the data subject”. What is the meaning and extent of this principle? This
question has raised a lot of debate, with diverging views emerging as to how the new
provisions should be interpreted.
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Some argue that the right to “meaningful information”, taken in the context of the
GDPR as a whole (especially in view of Section 22), establishes a right to an explanation
of individual automated decisions [3, 10]. So, for instance, if John Doe is denied credit
by a computer system that processes loan applications, John Doe will be entitled to an
explanation of why the system rejected his application. By contrast, others have argued
that the GDPR only gives data subjects a right to obtain a generic system description,
providing some information about the “logic” generally used to reach decisions, without
offering a concrete explanation for a given decision [11].
For rule-based symbolic systems, the distincton between an ex ante right to a system
description and an ex post right to an explanation is important in practice, but not
fundamental at the theoretical level. Rule-based systems admit ex ante descriptions (e.g.,
decision trees) that will – in theory – enable the data subject to predict what decisions
will be made about him on the basis of the available data (which the data subject has
an independent right to access). This, in turn, means that individual decisions can be
“explained” ex post, by simply examining the data and the system description. For
systems making use of machine learning techniques, this is different. For such systems,
the link between ex ante descriptions of the system and ex post explanations of its
decisions is inherently opaque. This is in part due to the fact that neither descriptions nor
explanations are readily available for such systems, at least not when they are supposed
to be provided in terms of “logic”, as required by the GDPR. Plainly, we have no
clear definition of what counts as an adequate system description for machine learning
algorithms, much less an adequate explanation of individual decisions.
In the following, we discuss some challenges that arises from this, from the point
of view of interpreting the legal language of the GDPR and giving meaningful theoretical
content to it from a computer science perspective. We argue that focusing on the perceived
distinction between ex ante and ex post forms of information is a misguided approach
to the problem. As we have seen, neither persepective actually provides a well-defined
approach to providing information about such systems, so the debate about which mode
of explanation the GDRP requires seems rather beside the point. On the legal side,
furthermore, the language of the GDPR is simply too vague to support any definite
conclusion as to the extent of the data subjects’ rights. This, we argue, is a feature of the
text as a legal document, not a bug. It facilitates legal dynamism, whereby technology
providers and courts must hear and consider diverging arguments about the scope of
data subjects’ rights in relation to automated decision-making. This will facilitate the
development of an evolving legal standard, deepening our understanding of the legal
implications of machine learning while helping to maintain congruence between law and
technology.
The situation is similar from the perspective of computer science; the question of what
counts as “meaningful information” about machine learning algorithms is a fundamental
question, raising unresolved questions addressed in philosophy of mind and knowledge.
Hence, it is unrealistic to expect any conclusive definition of what counts as meaningful
information about machine learning, as much as it is unrealistic to expect computer
scientists to settle deep questions of epistomology. We argue that the best way forward, in
light of this, is to encourage argumentation and debate about automated decision-making,
setting up a climate of critical inquiry that can produce “meaningful information” through
a dialectical process that resembles the manner in which people inquire into the motives
and reasons for human behaviours. The role of computer science, in this regard, is to
facilitate argumentation that is sound, exploring the unknown without ignoring those basic
rules of argument and partial facts about machine learning that computer science can in
fact provide and (possibly) enforce. However, while we must always aim for proper and
correct explanations, we also have to ensure that the explanations are not so complex that
users are unable to understand them.
2 Legal background
The basis of the right to “meaningful information about the logic involved” in automated
decision-making is found in Articles 13-15 of the GDPR, which all provide for this right
under different triggering conditions. While Articles 13 and 14 are triggered when data
collection takes place, Article 15 provides a more general right of access to information
for any subject whose personal information is “processed” by the system (including the
right to know whether or not personal information is actually being processed).
Consequently, the right to “meaningful information” kicks in not only when personal
data is collected, but also when it is used to inform an automated decision. This means
that a right to explanation for individual decisions ex post can be plausibly suggested as
one possible interpretation of the right to meaningful information. However, as argued
in [11], the legislative process leading to the final version of the GDPR suggests that an
explicit right to an explanation ex post was intentionally left out of the final version. This
can suggest a more restrictive interpretation, but it is hardly a conclusive argument. It is
perfectly possible, for instance, to regard an explicit right to an explanation as redundant
and potentially misleading alongside a more general right to “meaningful information
about the logic involved”. It is worth noting, for instance, that a “right to explanation” of
a decision is arguably far less demanding and more open to vacuous interpretations than
a requirement that the subject must be supplied with “meaningful information about the
logic”.
To exemplify, if John Doe is denied credit, an explanation amounting to the fact
that the system judged him to be a “high risk” applicant, on the basis of an “industry
standard” credit rating algorithm, might be taken to satisfy a lax interpretation of an ex
post explanation requirement. Indeed, reason-giving drawing on authority, reputation
and experience (as in the “industry standard” reference) cannot be rejected when the
requirement is simply to provide an explanation. However, when the requirement is
to provide meaningful information about the logic involved, we are forced to reject
explanations of this nature. In relation to the logic, appealing to authority and experience
becomes a fallacy of argumentation. Ruling out this kind of argumentation is a feature of
the language of the GDPR, which might have been diluted if the right to access the logic
of the system was qualified by a more specific – but potentially less demanding – “right
to an explanation” for individual decisions.
The broader point is that while the GDPR is open to interpretation and diverging
arguments about the scope of data subjects’ rights, it anchors those interpretations and
arguments in a rather demanding criteria focusing on the logic involed in decision-making.
For systems relying on machine learning, this anchor is far more signficant than the
ambiguity of whether explanations must be provided ex ante or ex post. Regardless, the
GDPR requires technology providers to address the logic involved in machine learning
algorithms. Since these algorithms are not based on logic, but statistical learning, the
GDPR introduces a highly significant constraint on the future development of artificial
intelligence. In fact, given the opacity of machine learning, the key question is not
whether the right to “meaningful information about the logic” pertains to systems or their
individual decisions, but whether the requirement can be fulfilled at all. In our opinion, we
can answer this in the affirmative, but only if we agree to interpret the constraint as a duty
for technology providers to facilitate rational argumentation about automated decision-
making, aimed at giving substance to the subjects’ right to challenge those decisions under
Article 22.
From a legal point of view, this interpretation – linking the right to information with a
right to challenge decisions – is strongly suggested by the language of Article 12-15. In
all these provisions, the right to information is conditional on “the existence of automated
decision-making, including profiling, referred to in Article 22(1) and (4)”. Furthermore,
the GDPR states only that the right to meaningful information about the logic involved
is triggered in “at least” those cases, i.e., the cases referred to in Article 22(1) and (4).
This highlights not only an explicit intention of providing a dynamic standard open to
interpretation (via the phrase “at least”), it also establishes a tight connection with Article
22.
To convey the significance of the link between the right to information and the right
to challenge automated decisions, we quote Article 22 in full below:
(1) The data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on
automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning
him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.
(2) Paragraph 1 shall not apply if the decision:
(a) is necessary for entering into, or performance of, a contract between the data
subject and a data controller;
(b) is authorised by Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject
and which also lays down suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s
rights and freedoms and legitimate interests; or
(c) is based on the data subject’s explicit consent.
(3) In the cases referred to in points (a) and (c) of paragraph 2, the data controller shall
implement suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s rights and freedoms
and legitimate interests, at least the right to obtain human intervention on the part
of the controller, to express his or her point of view and to contest the decision.
(4) Decisions referred to in paragraph 2 shall not be based on special categories of
personal data referred to in Article 9(2) 1), unless point (a) or (g) of Article 9(2)
applies and suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s rights and freedoms
and legitimate interests are in place.
We see that Article 22(1) establishes a limited right not to be subject to a “decision
based solely on automated processing”. However, this right is not without exception,
as clarified in Article 22(2). Furthermore, a crucial rule pertaining to this exception is
provided in Article 22(3): when the user is subjected to an automated decision that he
has not explicitly consented to, he is entitled to “express his or her point of view and
to contest the decision”. Importantly, this provision pertains to those “cases referred
to in Article 22(1)” where the expection in Article 22(2) (a) or (b) is also triggered.
Obviously, a right not to be subjected to automated decision-making makes the right to
contest such decisions redundant. Hence, in those cases under Article 22(1) where none
of the exceptions in Article 22(2) apply, the right to reject the decision as an unlawful
violation of Article 22(1) overshadows the right to explanation one might have under
Articles 13-15.
It follows that the right to “meaningful information” is particularly relevant for the
cases referred to in Article 22(3), which form a proper subset of cases referred to in Article
22(1). Nothing whatsoever can be inferred from the omission of an explicit reference to
Article 22(3) in Articles 12-15. In this regard, the interpretation argued for in [11] is
fallacious. It is clear from the wording of Article 22 that Article 22(3) pertains to cases
addressed in Article 22(1), bringing decision that data subjects are entitled to contest
under the scope of the right to obtain meaningful information about the logic involved.
Indeed, these are the cases when the right really matters; to contest an automated decision,
the data subject depends on this kind of information. Hence, instead of regarding those
cases as falling outside the scope of Articles 12-15, as [11] does, we conclude that they
make up the core cases targeted by this provision. As such, the interpretation of what
constitutes “meaningful information” must also reflect that the purpose is to provide data
subjects with a basis on which to contest automated decisions.
Specifically, in view of the reference made to Article 22(1), we believe the right to
meaningful information can be fulfilled by providing users with an adequate basis on
which to contest decisions that they have not explicitly consented to, but must nevertheless
accept in view of the exceptions in Article 22(2) (a) or (b). Effectively, we believe the right
to meaningful information should be interpreted as a constituent part of a more general
right to argue against automated decisions. In the following sections, we discuss some
consequences of this view, related to the interpretation of the “meaningful information”
requirement.
Hence, it is our contention that John Doe’s new rights entail that he is entitled to
an explanation of the decision which is both comprehensible and provides grounds for
contesting the decision, when he wishes to do so. This has some implications for how
frameworks for automated decision making should be designed and implemented, as
we discuss in the following sections. It is natural to develop GDPR-related system
constraints, concerning meaning and refutation, on the basis of well-established theories
of reason and argumentation, respectively.
3 Theories of mind and mindful theories of machines
When humans comprehend the behavior of other humans, they are said to have a theory
of mind. The notion of comprehension underpinning this concept is not based on formal
logic or epistemology, but on an intuitive ability to recognise mental states that motivate
human behaviour. In relation to machine learning, we cannot rely on any similar intuitive
understanding of the computational states that motivate certain automated decisions. The
problem of providing “meaningful information” about machine behaviour should not be
addressed by anthropomorphic explanations that attributed human-like mental states to
machines.
However, the deeper question of how intentional behaviour can be understood at
all seems to arise in much the same way regardless of whether we address humans,
animals, or machines. This is evident when considering the philosophy of mind, which
is dominated by theories that draw extensively on analogies between human reasoning
and various computational systems. At first sight, this would seem to offer a path
towards a methodology for explanation of behaviour that can also satisfy the “meaningful
information” requirement of the GDPR. However, as we will argue in the following, our
current best theories from the philosophy of mind fail to provide explanation strategies
that are conducive to rational argumentation about decision-making. Importantly,
however, these theories highlight certain important features of human reasoning that
should influence our assessment of what counts as meaningful information to a human
that seeks to understand a machine.
Theories from the philosophy of mind attempt to give an explanations of how the mind
works. We will discuss two prominent theories here because, in many central regards, they
are complementary to each other. Furthermore, they both highlight important challenges
that must be overcome to facilitate rational argumentation about automated decisions
based on machine learning.
The representational theory of mind
The representational theory [1] posits that we rely on an organized mental model of the
world when we relate to it. It puts forth two key ideas about understanding, namely
productivity and systematicity:
Productive Human thought is productive in the sense that there is no principal limit to
the depth of our understanding. I am the son of my father, the grandson of my
grandfather, the great grandson of my great grandfather, and so on. There seems
to be no limit to the number of generations we extend this to, while remaining
coherent.1
Systematicity There are certain relations between thoughts we do have, and toughts we
are able to have. If we believe the computer is to the left of the cup, we are able
to imagine that the cup could have been to the left of the computer. That is, there
are certain persistent permutations which seems permissible regardless of whether
or not they have ever been encountered.
The representational theory is well-aligned with so-called “classical” notions of
thought, emphasising rules of inference and the structure of explanations. However,
it has received substantial criticism, particularly in terms of its ability to provide a
causal explanation of behavior. There has been only limited success in esatblishing
credible computer systems that actually behave similarly to humans on the basis of this
theory. More importantly, while a representational account of symbolic AI systems
can be provided in principle, a representational account of machine learning is highly
implausible. If information about machine learning algorithms can only be regarded as
meaningful when it gives rise to human understanding that satisfies productivity and
systematicity, it seems doubtful that machine learning techniques can be considered
compatible with the GDPR at all.
Furthermore, even though we are able to replicate, say, systematicity in rule-based
systems which are able to say that certain predicates are symmetric (or the like), the
implementation of these systems bares little semblance to physical brains, much less
neural networks. Hence, we conclude that the representational theory has not yielded
a theory of how the brain functions as a machine, nor a theory of how the decisions made
by a complex machine learning algorithm could be said to have been “understood” by a
human under a productivity or systematicity constraint.
1If you are concerned that this seems to imply finitude, consider the fact that my greatn grandfather
might have chased a squirrel which might have been searching for nuts, which might have fallen on the first
day of fall, which might have coincided with... any arbitrary event.
Connectionism
In contrast to the representational theory of mind, connectionism stipulates that the mind
is essentially like a neural network. According to this theory, mental concepts are
represented as distributed patterns of activity over a network, resulting in a theory of sub-
symbolic and irreducibly complex mental states. This dispenses with the classical view
that the mind is a compositional system where concepts form as combinations of semantic
atoms, an idea that features prominently in the representational theory. Still, the theory
remains anchored in a computational understanding of mental processes, suggesting again
the possibility that our “understanding” of computer systems can be aided by a natural
correspondence between how such systems operate and how humans think.
However, there is a major obstacle to this mode of understanding machine learning
systems: there is no guarantee that we have any key concepts in common. While
humans and machine learning systems might be said to share aspects of the mechanism
by which connectionist mental states are realised, this does not entail that the mental
states themselves are commensurable. To illustrate this, consider translating a sentence
from one language into another. While well-educated adults might be said to rely on
representational modes of understanding (grammar, dictionaries etc.), children proficient
in both languages might be hypothesised to entertain connectionist representations of the
concepts involved, mapping to both languages with equal ease. However, in the case of
children, we are hard pressed to explain exactly how they do it [2].
Furthermore, connectionism provides no reason whatsoever to think that the manner
in which children translate between human languages bears any similarity to how Google
Translate does the same using machine learning techniques [12]. Regardless of the truth
of connectionism, the intermediate languages that deep learning algorithms rely on for
the purposes of translation might well be incomprehensible to humans [4]. Indeed,
the fact that Google Translate has arrived at translation techniques that are hard to
understand is arguably the reason why it now performs better than rule-based systems
relying exclusively on representational linguistics.
More generally, it seems that the promise and potential of machine learning might
be most signficant when it helps us in making predictions and decisions about chaotic
systems that humans seem incapable of comprehending analytically [9, 8]. These
are instances where neither a representational nor a connectionist account of human
understanding can provide pointers to “meaningful information” about the logic involved,
since the solution found by the machine is – to the best of our knowledge – inherently
meaningless to humans. In these cases, it seems to us that the best we can hope for
is incomplete and imprecise information that simplifies and abstracts away from the
details of how the machine reaches decisions. The question is what it takes for this type
of information to count as “meaningful information about the logic involed”. This is
where we think a focus on argumentation is in order, to differentiate between “good”
and “bad” forms of incomplete and imprecise information. Essentially, it seems to us
that good forms of incomplete and imprecise information are those forms of information
that afford data subjects meaningful fulfilment of their right to challenge decisions under
Article 22(3) of the GDPR. In the next section, we sketch how (informal) argumentation
theory can support an interpretation whereby “meaningful information about the logic
involved” can be taken as a requirement on technology providers to supply high-quality
enthymematic arguments that track the decision-making of machine learning algorithms
as closely as can reasonably be expected given our current level of understanding of such
systems.
4 On enthymematic arguments
Assume that there exists an ideal argument Am which perfectly expresses the reason for
p, e.g., a perfectly precise and accurate reason why a given machine learning algorithm
produces a certain output in a certain context. In this case, we can suggest any A that
also concludes with p as a so-called enthymematic argument (with unstated premises)
that approximates Am. We can do this even if Am is not understandable or too complex
to ever state in full. Staggering complexity is indeed the typical situation in human
argumentation, especially when discussing complex matters like politics, religion or why
we “like” a given Facebook post. In these cases, the arguments we use to explain
our position provide a necessarily imprecise and incomplete description of why we
hold certain beliefs, such as a belief in God, the ideals of social democracy, or the
aesthetic appeal of one of our friend’s wedding photos. While we labour under the belief
that there is a perfect Am explaining our position, what we require of A is that it is
both understandable and sufficiently precise. In real-world argumentation, this is what
“meaningful information about the logic involved” often amounts to.
To refine what we mean by “sufficiently precise”, we rely on perceived conformity
to the fragment of Am that is observable or known. So, for instance, if a belief in
fairness guides our belief in either God or social democracy, we are not expected to
argue for those positions on the basis of self-interest. Of course, fairness and self-
interest might be compatible under some theories, but the contradiction between these
sentiments is sufficiently plausible to render it a prima facie challenge that can be raised
against apparently selfish Christians or seemingly egotistical social democrats. Indeed,
part of the reason why humans seem rather preoccupied with the apparent hypocrisy
and the general reputation of other arguers is that they depend on such considerations
when attemtping to judge whether a given enthymematic argument should be considered
a “good” approximation of some ideal argument that sets out a coherent case in full.
In the context of providing meaningful information about automated decision-making,
similar considerations can and should be made. The perspective we adopt should be
holistic, based on a recognition that the best we can hope for in terms of “meaningful
information about the logic involved” are enthymematic arguments about the system that
we collectively judge as adequate or not for the purposes of rational argumentation. This
shift of perspective takes a significant aspect of what it means to explain automated
decisions out of the computer science realm, importing it instead into the realm of the
social sciences. This might not be desirable as such, but it is necessary. Even the
best human engineers are unable to give a precise causal explanation of the output of
a sufficiently complex neural network. Hence, the situation is parallel to that encountered
in human argumentation; we are forced to abandon the use of either representational
(classical) logic or connectionist (causal) descriptions when we wish to communicate
reasons for complex behaviors and beliefs.
We are forced to permit vagueness in the description of the computer behavior,
which consequently means that we are forced to develop strategies for dealing with this
vagueness. In [7, 6], we encounter the notion of the “crater”, used to refer to the space
of possible interpretations or completions of a given enthymematic argument. Given this
terminology, a high-level description of how vagueness should be dealt with is to say that
whenever the complete argument Am is contained in the crater of the actually uttered A,
then either:
1. the crater is too large, or
2. the user understands Am.
When the crater is “too large”, we must insist that the actor narrows the space
of possible completions and interpretations. This can only be done by dissecting the
phenomenon under consideration to produce new enthymematic arguments (with smaller
craters) and then recombining them in some way. There is an important balance here
between the accuracy we are legally entitled to and the accuracy that actors can afford
to provide. Importantly, this trade-off cannot be considered from a vantage point outside
the context of the argument and its audience. Considerations pertaining to vagueness and
accuracy form critical parts of the dialectic social process by which a group of people
exchange arguments about some phenomenon. The idea that sound knowledge is gained
at the group level from such processes, despite their adversarial characteristics, is crucial
to the so-called argumentative theory of reason [5]. This theory claims that reasoning as
such evolved to facilitate good arguments conducive to winning debates, not to arrive at
the truth. Even so, the theory claims, the collective pursuit of the truth is generally helped
by this, as participants adopt a highly critical attitude to claims contradicting their own
beliefs (often indicative of confirmation bias at the individual level).
It seems to us that while the philosophy of mind discusses many interesting hypotheses
regarding human understanding and computational processes, it is the argumentative
theory of reason that provides the best theoretical basis on which to determine the extent of
the right to “meaningful information” in the GDPR. Importantly, this theory highlights the
importance of argumentation, facilitated by arenas where different actors with conflicting
interests are able to engage in meaningful debate. It is our opinion that if the right to
meaningful information is interpreted in view of Article 22, it can serve to establish
just such an arena, where the asymmetry of power between data subjects and technology
providers is offset by the fact that the latter is required by law to facilitate the necessary
raw materials that will enable the data subject to argue against the decision made by the
system. This is reminiscent of the principle of falsification adopted to great effect in the
experimental natural sciences, with one key difference: the testing bed for automated
decision-making will not be the laboratory, but the public sphere and – ultimately – the
courts. Hopefully, the principle can still serve to facilitate incrimental improvements in
our collective understanding of how machine learning works, how it can be improved,
and when it is appropriate to apply it. In so far as this objective is reached, moreover, we
should hardly hesitate in concluding that we have indeed arrived at a fitting interpretation
of what “meaningful information” actually means.
5 Implications for computer science
Modern machine learning is achieving precision and accuracy beyond what many other
approaches in AI are capable of. While it would clearly be folly not to utilize these new
methods as the precision and accuracy they provide clearly demonstrate their value. Such
measures of quality are a necessary condition for their application, but GDPR entails
that these measures in themselves are not sufficient in many circumstances. The new
EU regulation addresses the cases in which a decision concerning an individual subject
is produced automatically. We have argued for why we believe that this new regulation
grants the subject a right to meaningful information in order to enable her to produce an
informed objection.
A key difficulty in formulating this consideration as a software constraint, is including
a requirement of meaningfulness. This issue has not been extraordinarily pressing in
traditional AI. Symbolic, rule based systems are closely related to the representational
theory of minds – yielding a transparent relationship between human understanding and
computer algorithms. Constructing a decision by composing the rules that constitute such
a system can also form an understandable explanation. Even in this case, however, such an
argument structure might be simplified in order to enhance comprehension by eliminating
obvious or commonly known premises, not including which rules were applied and why,
and so on. This is precisely to construct an enthymeme. Notice that even if these rules
are strict logical rules in the framework, they may not be admissible when we eliminate
premises. Therefore, the simplified explanation will generally also rely on defeasible
rules.
Unlike the decisions extracted from the constituent parts of a rule based systems, the
decisions from non-symbolic or sub-symbolic algorithms, such as the output of neural
networks, must somehow be synthesised in order to comply with the GDPR. Then these
decisions may also be connected with the construction of rules which are informative to
the subject. One way of achieving such a representation is to find correlations between
particular sub-symbolic features and natural predicates which permit us to illustrate
conditions which align with the network’s output. Regardless, it is up to the system
designer to construct a necessarily lossy projection from the neural network’s values on
to features of natural language which explain the output. Regardless of how the projection
is constructed, it can not convey the entire decision process. As demonstrated in [9, 8],
there are efficient systems that are inherently incomprehensible. When we want to provide
the required information, we are indeed, producing an enthymeme.
Hence, we need – we are legally obliged – to balance between well-established
measures of quality such as precision and accuracy on the one hand, and a meaningful
explanation on the other hand. This explanation must necessarily be less complex than
the full analysis in many cases. This, we argue, is a consequence of a natural interpretation
of the GDPR. Additionally, we believe that there is good reason to consider systems based
on defeasible logic as a natural technology to fill this gap.
In the confluence between logic and argumentation, the notion of an enthymeme
naturally performs this function in human dialogue. The recent developments in formal
argumentation theory seems very well-positioned to help us formalize this challenging
balance. When we develop or apply methods for automatic decision making, we need to
take this new challenge into account.
6 Conclusion
The clash between the wavefront of enthusiastic innovation in computer technology and
conservative forces emphasising the dangers of artificial intelligence are entering an
exciting period. Human perception of what is required according to a system of rules
and what is achievable according to a holistic understanding of the world are both put
to the test, raising the question of how we should balance effectiveness and fairness
when developing the computer systems of the future. This is not a recent problem, but
until recently it has been pressing only in fantasy novels and the works of progressive
philosophers.
As the GDPR is coming into effect, we are seeing a clash between several competing
stances on the very meaning of artificial intelligence; particularly between effective
machine learning and understandable rule-based systems. We argue that the distinction
is reminiscent of a deep, philosophical divide, but that there is a pragmatic compromise:
argumentation theory. We can balance the expressive ability of connectionistic machine
learning approaches which are difficult to relate to on the one hand, and readily
comprehensible rule-based approaches generally subscribing to the representation theory
of mind.
When the user is able to challenge impenetrable conclusions of machine learning,
forcing answers that split explanations up into (potentially non-deductively closed) sets
of understandable claims, the user will finally be able to claim the rights she is entitled to;
meaningful information about the logic applied in the analysis of her data. As we have
argued in this paper, there is a good argument to be made that something along these lines
is now a legal entitlement for data subjects under the GDPR.
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